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The analyst decision to issue revenue forecasts: do firm reporting 







Abstract  This study documents that analysts are more likely to issue revenue forecasts to 
complement earnings-per-share (EPS) estimates when the quality of firm financial reporting is 
low. This is because, compared to EPS forecast accuracy, revenue forecast accuracy is less 
adversely affected by poor reporting quality. Consequently, investors rely more on revenue than 
EPS estimates in their investment decisions, when the reporting quality is low. The result is 
robust to using five proxies for the quality of firm financial reporting: the variation in 
discretionary accruals, the absolute level of discretionary accruals, earnings persistence, absolute 
total accruals, and earnings volatility. Further, we document that better earnings forecasters are 
more likely to issue revenue estimates. This is because only more skilled analysts would want 
their forecasts to be subject to higher market scrutiny, and because a combination of accurate 
revenue and EPS forecasts is a stronger signal of the analyst forecasting skill compared to an 
accurate stand-alone EPS estimate.  
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Over the past decade analysts have increasingly supplemented their earnings forecasts with 
estimates of other accounting numbers, such as revenue.1 Yet we know little about what 
determines the analyst choice to issue revenue forecasts to complement earnings-per-share (EPS) 
estimates. This study examines if the firm financial reporting quality2 and analyst forecasting skill 
influence the analyst decision to issue a revenue forecast. We propose that an analyst will provide 
a revenue forecast to complement the EPS estimate when firm reporting quality is poor. This is 
because revenue forecast accuracy is less adversely affected by poor reporting quality, compared 
to EPS forecast precision. As a result, investors rely more on revenue than EPS estimates in their 
investment decisions when the reporting quality is low. Further, we propose that better earnings 
forecasters use revenue estimates to signal their forecasting skill. This is because only more 
skilled analysts would want their forecasts to be subject to higher market scrutiny, and because a 
combination of accurate revenue and EPS forecasts is a stronger signal of analyst forecasting 
skill compared to an accurate stand-alone EPS estimate. 
 To examine the two predictions, we look at all one-year-ahead EPS estimates and the 
accompanying revenue forecasts for US firms over the fiscal years 2000–2008. We find that of 
the 539,437 individual analyst EPS forecasts reported on IBES, 50.3% are supplemented by 
revenue estimates, and that the proportion of revenue estimates to complement EPS forecasts 
increases from 11.8% in 2000 to 68.7% in 2008. This confirms that revenue forecasts have 
become increasingly common over the past decade.  
 We follow previous literature (e.g. Johnson et al. 2002; Francis et al. 2005; Elliott et al. 
2010) and use the variation in discretionary accruals and the absolute level of discretionary 
accruals as our main firm reporting quality measures. We document that compared to stand-
                                                          
1 We document that one in two EPS forecasts in our sample includes a complementary revenue forecast.  
2 We follow the FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts and define firm financial reporting quality as the 
ability of the firm’s financial statements to provide accurate information on firm operations and cash flows that is 
valuable to investors in making rational investment decisions. We discuss further the concept of firm financial 
reporting quality in Section 2. 
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alone EPS forecasts, the variation in (the magnitude of) discretionary accruals is 21% (7.3%) 
higher when analysts issue revenue forecasts. Multivariate logistic regressions confirm that 
analysts’ propensity to issue revenue forecasts increases with the variation in discretionary 
accruals and with the magnitude of absolute discretionary accruals. The result is both statistically 
and economically significant, and is consistent with the prediction that investors demand revenue 
forecasts when the quality of a firm’s financial reporting is low. Our conclusions remain robust 
when we use alternative measures of reporting quality, namely earnings persistence, absolute 
value of total accruals, and earnings volatility.  
Analysts who issue more accurate EPS forecasts are more likely to produce a revenue 
estimate, which is consistent with more skilled analysts signaling their ability through the issue of 
revenue estimates. The result remains unchanged when we use alternative measures of analyst 
forecasting skill, namely the analyst relative EPS forecast accuracy (i.e. the accuracy of an 
analyst’s EPS forecast relative to the accuracy of EPS forecasts by other analysts following a 
firm), and analyst past forecast accuracy. The finding that revenue forecasts serve to signal 
analyst forecasting skill complements the result in Ertimur et al. (2011), who report that analysts 
without established reputations are more likely to produce a revenue forecast; once an analyst 
has established a reputation, revenue forecasts expose the analyst to additional market scrutiny 
and risk of reputation loss, which reduces the analyst propensity to issue revenue forecasts. 
Sensitivity analysis shows that our conclusions remain robust for annual regressions, 
which examine if the results are not confined to a specific sub-period, and when we use the 
Fama–MacBeth approach and random sample selection as alternative ways to control for inflated 
t-statistics due to the cross-sectional correlation of observations (all our regressions use dual 
clustering on firm and analyst). To confirm that our results are not driven by the potential 
recursive effect that a revenue forecast issue may have on a firm propensity to manage accruals, 
we repeat the analysis using only initiations of revenue forecasts for a firm. This is because a 
revenue estimate may aid investors in identifying firms that engage in revenue management to 
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boost firm net income, e.g. through discount sales close to the end of the fiscal year 
(Roychowdhury 2006). The higher cost of revenue management in the presence of revenue 
forecasts may incentivize managers to substitute revenue management for accruals management. 
This could explain why analysts are more likely to produce a revenue forecast when the reporting 
quality is low. We find that the firm reporting quality and analyst forecasting skill also influence 
the analyst decision to start issuing revenue forecasts, which corroborates our main results.  
We conjecture that investors demand revenue forecasts because revenue forecast 
accuracy is less adversely affected by poor reporting quality, compared to EPS forecast precision. 
As a result, when the reporting quality is poor, Bayesian investors rely more on the estimates of 
earnings’ components (i.e. revenue) than on earnings themselves in their investment decisions. 
Consistent with this prediction, we show that low reporting quality increases the EPS forecast 
error, but does not affect revenue forecast accuracy. Further, we document that the price 
reaction to EPS forecast revisions is lower for firms with poor reporting quality; however, the 
price reaction to revenue forecast revisions is unaffected by reporting quality. This confirms that 
when reporting quality is low, investors attach lower weight to EPS forecast revisions in their 
investment decisions, but continue to rely on revenue estimates. 
This paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, we add to the fledgling 
literature that examines the analyst choice to issue forecasts of other accounting measures, such 
as revenue, to complement EPS estimates. To date, only Ertimur et al. (2011) and Marks (2007) 
have examined the determinants of the analyst decision to provide revenue forecasts, with both 
papers investigating if analyst reputation explains the decision to produce revenue forecasts. Our 
results suggest that analysts rationally respond to investor demand and produce revenue 
forecasts, when the complementary forecast is most useful to investors, i.e. when firm reporting 
quality is poor. Further, we show that controlling for analyst reputation3, analyst EPS forecasting 
                                                          
3 Analyst reputation is commonly measured from analyst rankings. However, press articles and previous studies 
report that analyst rankings by the Institutional Investor magazine and The Wall Street Journal do not aid investors 
in identifying better earnings forecasts (Dorfman 1988; Kessler 2001; and Emery and Li 2009). For example, Emery 
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skill is a strong predictor of the decision to issue a complementary revenue estimate. The latter 
result is particularly valuable to investors, as it can help them identify accurate EPS forecasts 
issued by more skilled analysts. This in return should improve investors’ capital allocation 
decisions.  
Second, we add important evidence to studies on the capital markets effects of issuing 
revenue estimates to accompany EPS forecasts. Our findings explain the results in Ertimur et al. 
(2011) and Keung (2010) that (1) EPS forecast revisions accompanied by revenue forecasts have 
a greater price impact than stand-alone EPS forecast revisions, and that (2) supplemented EPS 
estimates are more accurate ex post. These findings are not surprising since we document that 
revenue forecasts are issued by analysts with higher forecasting skill, and because investors rely 
on (relatively more accurate) revenue than earnings estimates in their investment decisions, when 
the quality of firm reporting is poor. Future studies on the capital market effects of revenue 
forecasts need to control for the endogeneity in the analyst decision to produce this estimate.  
Third, our finding that the quality of financial reporting influences the analyst decision to 
produce a supplementary revenue forecast adds valuable new evidence on the capital market 
effects of firm disclosure (Healy and Palepu 2001; Dechow et al. 2010), and on the interaction 
between firm disclosure and information provision by analysts (Barth et al., 2001; Francis et al. 
2002; Frankel et al. 2006; Beyer et al, 2010). Further, the finding that analysts issue 
complementary revenue forecasts to mitigate the adverse effect that poor reporting quality has 
on the accuracy and value-relevance of EPS estimates, adds important evidence to the literature 
on the role that financial analysts play in capital markets (Ivkovic and Jegadeesh 2004; Asquith et 
al. 2005; Ramnath et al. 2008; Chen et al. 2010). 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and Li (2009) document that analyst EPS forecast accuracy does not predict star analyst status from the Wall Street 
Journal ranking, and from the Institutional Investor magazine ranking when controlling for the analyst previous year 
ranking. Further, Bagnoli et al. (2008) report that EPS forecast accuracy ranks among the least important factors 
influencing the voting for Institutional Investor star analysts. Investors seem to recognize that popular analyst 
rankings are poor at identifying top EPS forecasters and react equally to EPS forecast revisions by star and non-star 
analysts (Gleason and Lee 2003).  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the previous literature 
and develops our empirical hypotheses. Section 3 presents the research design and we describe 
the data in Section 4. The empirical results are presented in Section 5 and robustness tests are 
discussed in Section 6. Section 7 examines the relation between reporting quality and the 
accuracy and price impact of analyst EPS and revenue forecasts. We conclude in Section 8. 
 
2 Previous literature and hypotheses development 
 
Earnings are considered a better aggregate indicator of firm periodic performance than other 
accounting numbers, such as revenue (Hopwood and McKeown 1985; Hoskin et al. 1986; 
Easton et al. 1992; Beyer et al. 2010). However, poor financial reporting quality reduces reliability 
and usefulness of earnings as a firm performance measure and a predictor of future earnings 
(Dechow et al. 2010). As a result, the quality of firm financial reporting is likely to influence 
investor demand for revenue forecasts to complement earnings estimates.  
Revenue numbers are valuable to investors as they facilitate earnings decomposition into 
its two main drivers, sales revenue and (after-tax) profit margin. Consistent with this rationale, 
Ertimur et al. (2003) and Jegadeesh and Livnat (2006) report higher market reactions to revenue 
than earnings surprises, and Ghosh et al. (2005) report that investors rely more on growth in 
revenue than in earnings when valuing firms that exhibit continuous increases in both earnings 
and revenue. This is because revenue increases are more persistent than reductions in expenses.  
Research on what explains analyst choice to issue revenue forecasts is limited. Ertimur et 
al. (2011) show that controlling for analyst ability to understand the firm’s earnings generating 
process4, analyst reputation explains the decision to produce revenue forecasts. They find that 
analysts without established reputations are more likely to produce a revenue forecast. For 
                                                          
4 Ertimur et al. (2011, 39) measure analyst ability as “the extent to which forecasts from a given analyst move the 
outstanding consensus toward actual earnings”, which may not distinguish between the analyst EPS forecasting skill 
and other determinants of the analyst influence on the consensus forecast. Intuitively, the reputation of the analyst’s 
brokerage house and analyst forecasting experience are likely to be more important in moving the consensus than 
the analyst forecasting skill.  
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established analysts, revenue forecasts expose them to additional market scrutiny and risk of 
reputation loss, which reduces their propensity to issue revenue forecasts. Further, using a 
sample of less reputable analysts only, they find that analysts who issue revenue estimates are 
more likely to be promoted to a more prestigious broker, and that EPS forecast revisions 
accompanied by revenue forecasts have a stronger price reaction. Marks (2007) provide evidence 
consistent with Ertimur et al. (2011).  
This study proposes that investors demand revenue forecasts when the quality of firm 
financial reporting is low. This is because revenue forecast accuracy should be less adversely 
affected by poor reporting quality compared to EPS forecasts precision. As a result, investors 
would rely more on revenue than EPS estimates in their investment decisions when the reporting 
quality is low. Therefore, out first hypothesis is: 
 
H1 Analysts are more likely to issue revenue forecasts for firms with low quality financial 
reporting.  
 
Further, we propose that controlling for analyst reputation, better earnings forecasters are more 
likely to issue revenue forecasts. This is because only more skilled analysts would want their 
forecasts to be subject to higher market scrutiny, and because a combination of accurate revenue 
and EPS forecasts is a stronger signal of the analyst forecasting skill compared to an accurate 
stand-alone EPS estimate only. In other words, a precise EPS forecast that is accompanied by an 
inaccurate revenue forecast signals that analyst EPS accuracy is due to luck rather than innate 
forecasting skill. As a result, poor EPS forecasters will be unwilling to issue revenue forecasts as 
they risk revealing their type to investors, which can lead to reputation loss that can have a direct 
effect on analyst career outcomes (Hong and Kubik 2003; Leone and Wu 2007). Consequently, 
the issue of revenue forecasts forms a credible signal that distinguishes better earnings 




H2 Better earnings forecasters are more likely to issue revenue forecasts. 
 
3 Measures of firm financial reporting quality and research design 
 
In defining the quality of firm financial reporting, we build on the FASB Statement of Financial 
Accounting concepts no 1., which states that the objective of financial reporting is to “provide 
information that is useful to present and potential investors and creditors and other users in 
making rational investment, credit and similar decisions”, that the information needs to be 
“comprehensible” to investors, and that it should help “present and potential investors in 
assessing the amount, timing, and uncertainty of prospective cash receipts”.5  
To measure firm financial reporting quality, we use the variation in discretionary accruals 
and the magnitude of discretionary accruals.6 The two proxies measure the characteristics of firm 
disclosure that FASB associates with reporting quality. Further, the two measures reflect that 
managers can use discretionary accruals either to reduce accruals volatility, improving the quality 
of earnings as a measure of firm current and future performance7, or they can use discretionary 
accruals to manage earnings (Dechow et al. 1995; Dechow and Dichev 2002; McNichols 2002; 
Dechow et al. 2003), which lowers informativeness of current earnings about firm current and 
future performance.   
We use the predicted values from the McNichols’ (2002) extension of the Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) accruals model to capture non-discretionary (normal) accruals originating from 
company operations. The model’s residuals represent discretionary (abnormal) accruals, which 
are subject to managerial discretion and capture financial reporting quality. The accruals model 
takes the form  
                                                          
5 The recent review of earnings quality literature by Dechow et al. (2010) also uses FASB Statement of Financial 
Accounting concepts no 1. to define earnings quality. 
6 For an in-depth discussion of earnings quality proxies, we refer the reader to a number of comprehensive review 
papers including Dechow et al. (2010), Francis et al. (2006), Lo (2008), Dechow and Schrand (2004), Imhoff (2003), 
Penman (2003), Nelson et al. (2003), Schipper and Vincent (2003). 
7 Low variation in discretionary accruals and low magnitude of discretionary accruals means that current earnings are 
more informative about future cash flow, which makes current earnings more useful to investors in firm valuation 
and investment decisions. 
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where CAit stands for current accruals for firm i in year t, defined as the change in current assets, 
less change in cash, less change in current liabilities plus the change in debt in current liabilities.  
CFO is cash flow from operations and equals net income before extraordinary items less current 
accruals. Both CAit and the three CFO variables are scaled by average total assets for the current 
and previous fiscal year and on their own form the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model. 
McNichols’ (2002) extension of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model includes in the accruals 
model the gross value of property plan and equipment, PPE, and changes in firm sales, ΔSAL, 
both scaled by average assets. Including PPE and ΔSAL decreases the measurement error and 
improves the model’s explanatory power (McNichols 2002; Francis et al. 2005).  
The model residuals, uit, measure firm discretionary accounting accruals. The current 
period accruals quality is the standard deviation of firm residuals for years t−3 to t, 
CAQ=STD(uit). Large variation in discretionary accruals means poor mapping of accruals into 
cash flows, which suggests poor current accruals quality. We also use absolute value of 
discretionary accruals, |D ACC|, as an alternative measure of reporting quality. Following 
Francis et al. (2005), we estimate both models annually for each 2-digit SIC industry with a 
minimum of 20 firms.8 Table 1 provides detailed definitions of variables in model (1) and of 
other variables used in the study. 
Consistent with the previous literature, we use analyst individual absolute EPS forecast 
error (|FE|) to capture analyst forecasting skill (Clement 1999; Hong et al. 2000; Dechow et al. 
2000; Park and Stice 2000). Accurate EPS forecasts indicate higher forecasting skill and better 
EPS forecasters should be more likely to issue revenue forecasts to signal their quality. In 
robustness tests, we also use analyst relative forecasts accuracy, i.e. accuracy of analyst EPS 
                                                          
8 We also used the modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995) and the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model to 
estimate the variation in and the magnitude of firm discretionary accruals. The results are qualitatively the same 
using the discretionary accruals measures from these models.  
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estimates relative to the accuracy of all EPS forecasts issued for the firm in a fiscal year, and 
analyst past EPS accuracy.  
 
3.1. Research design 
 
We use a logit model to predict the analyst choice to include a revenue forecast with the EPS 
estimate. Our main explanatory variables are the firm financial reporting quality and the analyst 
forecasting skill. We split control variables into (1) analyst- and broker-related characteristic, and 
(2) firm characteristics.  
  
3.1.1 Analyst and broker characteristics 
 
EPS forecasts issued early in the fiscal year are more valuable to investors (Clement and Tse 
2003) but are less likely to be accurate (Sinha et al. 1997). To increase credibility of EPS 
estimates issued early in the fiscal year, analysts can complement them with revenue estimates. 
We measure forecast timeliness as the number of days between the EPS forecast announcement 
and the fiscal year-end (Horizon). We use analyst general (Gexp) experience and the size of the 
analyst’s broker firm (Bsize), to capture analyst’s reputation. Less experienced analysts and 
analysts from smaller brokers may want to issue revenue forecasts to differentiate themselves 
from the competing analysts; once an analyst has established a reputation, revenue forecasts 
expose the analyst to additional market scrutiny and risk of reputation loss, which reduces the 
analyst propensity to issue revenue forecasts (Marks 2007, Ertimur et al. 2011). The number of 
firms an analyst follows (A_#Firm) proxies for task complexity. Actively following and 
producing research reports on more companies is likely to discourage the analyst from devoting 
time to produce a complementary forecast. Forecast horizon, analyst and broker characteristics 




3.1.2 Firm characteristics 
 
We include firm market capitalization (MV) and the number of analysts following a company 
(Follow) to capture the quality of the firm’s information environment. Better quality information 
environment reduces the cost of producing a complementary forecast, which should increase the 
likelihood an analyst will issue complementary revenue forecast.  
The coefficient of stock price variation (COV) measures stock price variability. High 
price volatility means that the analyst faces a more challenging task forecasting earnings, which is 
likely to reduce the analyst propensity to include a complementary revenue forecast. Further, 
analysts will face higher difficulty forecasting revenue when firm sales vary strongly across years, 
which is likely to reduce analyst propensity to issue revenue forecasts. However, high stock price 
and revenue volatility may also increase investor demand for a complementary revenue forecast 
that can help investors in assessing firm performance. We use the standard deviation in firm 
revenues for the previous four fiscal years (STD REV) to capture the revenue uncertainty.  
We use the book-to-market ratio (B/M) to measure the firm growth opportunities. We 
include firm age (Age) as analysts are more likely to produce revenue estimates for younger firms 
(Ertimur et al. 2011). Investors are more likely to demand revenue estimates for loss making 
firms and for less profitable firms where firm earnings may not be representative of firm value 
(Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Collins et al. 1997).  We use a dummy variable (Dloss) to indicate 
loss-making firms and return on assets (ROA) to capture firm profitability. Further, investors are 
more likely to demand revenue forecasts for firms with high operating leverage. This is because a 
one percentage increase in revenue has a stronger effect on firm net income for firms with high 
compared to low ratios of fixed to variable costs. We capture operating leverage using net margin 
(Margin). To control for solvency and firm distress risk, we include a measure of firm financial 
leverage (LEV). We include a set of year dummies (Year dummies) and 10 industry dummies 
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(Industry dummies) based on 2-digit IBES SIG codes to control for year- and industry-effects.9 All 
firm characteristics, but analyst following, are measured at the end of the previous fiscal year. 
Analyst following is measured at the forecast issue date.  
 The empirical specification of the regression model is 
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where ijtDREV is an indicator variable if an EPS forecast by analyst j for firm i issued at time t is 
supplemented by a revenue estimate, and zero otherwise, and ln indicates a logarithmic 
transformation of the variable. For analyst EPS forecast error, experience, and forecast horizon 
we use log of 1 plus the variable to account for zero values. A variation of model 2 uses absolute 
discretionary accruals, |D ACC|, in lieu of CAQ as a proxy firm reporting quality.10 The 
regression standard errors are clustered by analyst and by firm to control for serial dependence 
of observations.11 
 
4 Data and sample 
 
We select all one-year-ahead earnings and revenue forecasts issued over 1995–2009 together with 
their actual values from IBES detail files for US firms. For comparability with EPS estimates, we 
                                                          
9 IBES SIG code is a six-digit code, representing the sector (2-digits), the industry (2-digits) and the group (2-digits) 
a firm operates in.  
10 For the regression model where we use absolute discretionary accruals, we also control for the magnitude of 
absolute normal (innate) accruals, |nD ACC|, as investors may incorrectly perceive high normal accruals as 
indicative of poor reporting quality and demand revenue estimate when firm non-discretionary accruals are high.  
11 Our regression model differs from Ertimur et al. (2011, 39), who model “if the analyst issues at least one 
disaggregated forecast (that is, both a revenue and earnings forecast) during both the first half and second half of the 
year”. Ertimur et al.’ model may fail to recognize that revenue forecasts that infrequently complement EPS estimates 
may be of little value to investors, and that revenue forecasts that complement each EPS estimate send a stronger 
signal of the analyst forecasting skill. Also, Ertimur et al.’ regressions do not use firm- and analyst-clustered standard 
errors to control for cross-sectional dependence of observations.  
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scale revenue forecasts by the number of shares outstanding reported on IBES at the end of the 
forecast issue month. We discard analyst forecasts before January 2000 to ensure sufficient 
variation in analyst experience estimates. This is because left censoring of data on IBES does not 
distinguish more from less experienced analysts in the first year of available data and the early 
sample period may have little variation in analyst experience (Clement 1999). Financial statement 
information is from Compustat and stock price information is from CRSP. Estimates of accrual 
quality constrain fiscal periods to between 2000 and 2009.  All variables are winsorized at 1%. 
Our final sample includes 539,437 EPS forecasts and 271,139 revenue estimates over 2000–
2008.12 
Table 2 shows the distribution of all EPS forecasts, stand-alone EPS forecasts, and 
revenue estimates across the fiscal years. The total number of EPS forecasts increases from 
41,104 in 2000 to 68,796 in 2008. The increase in the number of revenue forecasts that 
accompany EPS estimates is almost ten-fold, from 4,851 in 2000 to 47,289 in 2008. Overall, one 
in two EPS forecasts over the sample period included a revenue forecast, and the proportion of 
revenue estimates to complement EPS forecasts increases from 11.8% in 2000 to 68.7% in 2008. 
This shows that stand-alone EPS forecasts have become increasingly rare over time. There are 
6,940 analysts and 532 brokerage houses providing forecasts for 2,615 firms. Overall, results in 
Table 2 suggest that analysts routinely complement EPS forecasts with revenue estimates.  
 
5 Empirical results 
 
To examine the determinants of the analyst choice to issue revenue forecasts to accompany EPS 
estimates, we start with a non-parametric portfolio analysis followed by a multivariate regression 
analysis. 
                                                          
12
 As our empirical tests are based on IBES data rather than individual analyst reports, our two research questions 
are strictly (1) whether an analyst will provide a revenue forecast to complement the EPS estimate supplied to IBES 
when reporting quality is poor and (2) whether better earnings forecasters who report their estimates to IBES use revenue 
estimates to signal their forecasting skill. As both full analyst reports and IBES data are available to investors (e.g. 
analyst reports can be directly purchased form the broker or through Investext), it is unlikely that analysts would 
engage in strategic disclosure of revenue forecasts in the report but not through IBES. 
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5.1 Non-parametric portfolio analysis 
 
As a simple test of the correlation between analyst propensity to issue revenue estimates and 
reporting quality, we plot the frequency of complementary revenue forecasts across decile sorts 
on the variation in discretionary accruals (CAQ) and the magnitude of discretionary accruals (|D 
ACC|). Figure 1 shows that the proportion of revenue forecasts to accompany EPS estimates 
increases from 39% to 65% as we move from the decile of stocks with the highest reporting 
quality (High Q) to the decile of stocks with the lowest reporting quality (Low Q) formed on 
CAQ. In unreported results we find that the difference in the frequency of revenue estimates 
between these two portfolios is significant at 1% level. The upwards trends in the frequency of 
revenue estimates is also present for sorts on |D ACC|. Together, Figure 1 provides the first 
evidence that analysts are more likely to provide revenue estimates when firm reporting quality is 
low.   
 Building on Figure 1, Panel A of Table 3 reports average CAQ and |D ACC| for stand-
alone EPS forecasts and for EPS estimates accompanied by a revenue forecast. Both reporting 
quality measures are significantly higher when an analyst issues a revenue forecast, consistent 
with the prediction that revenue forecasts are more common when the quality of firm accounting 
accruals is poor.  
Panel B of Table 3 shows the distribution of stand-alone EPS forecasts and EPS 
forecasts supplemented by a revenue estimate across 11 industries based on the 2-digit IBES 
SIG code. Stand-alone EPS forecasts are most common in the energy sector and in the public 
utilities industry. These are mature industries with relatively simple business models where EPS 
forecasts are likely to accurately reflect firm performance over the fiscal year. Revenue forecasts 
are most common in the technology and in the health industry. Disaggregating earnings for these 
industries may increase the transparency and interpretability of earnings numbers. This is 
consistent with Bowen et al. (2002), who argue that investors rely on revenue rather than 
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earnings in valuing technology firms. Together, the results in Table 3 confirm that revenue 
estimates are more common when investors face a more difficult valuation task due to poor firm 
financial reporting quality. 
In unreported results, we find that the mean EPS forecast error is higher for stand-alone 
earnings forecasts than for EPS complemented by revenue estimates (1.36% vs. 1.28%). Given 
that revenue forecasts are issued on average for firms with lower reporting quality, the result is 
consistent with better able analysts being more likely to report a complementary revenue 
forecast.  
 
5.2 Multivariate analysis: descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables 
 
We start the multivariate analysis by presenting summary statistics for the dependent and 
explanatory variables in regression model (2). Panel A of Table 4 shows that the mean EPS 
forecast error is 1.32% of the stock price, and the average forecast is issued in mid fiscal year. On 
average, an analyst has been present in the sample for over 6 years, follows over 13 firms, and is 
employed by a broker house with over 56 analysts. Panel B of Table 4 shows descriptive statistics 
for firm-related characteristics. Mean CAQ is 0.059 and the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals is 0.048. For completeness, we also report the value of non-discretionary accruals, which 
is 0.048. Average firm market capitalization is close to $4 billion, and a firm is followed on 
average by over 10 analysts. The coefficient of stock price variation is 0.087, mean revenue 
variation is 0.147, and book-to-market ratio is 0.498. Average firm age is 21 years13, and mean 
firm profitability is close to 2%. Around 18% of firms reported a loss in the previous fiscal year, 
and the median net margin is 0.045. The average firm gearing is 0.181.  
  
 
                                                          
13 We use CRSP files starting in 1926 to calculate firm age, which captures a few large companies with long-time 
series of stock prices. This explains high mean firm age.  
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5.2.1 Multivariate regressions: empirical results 
 
The first columns of Table 5 show results from the logit model (2) where we use CAQ to 
capture firm reporting quality. The later columns show results for model (2) when we use the 
absolute magnitude of discretionary accruals to capture reporting quality.14 For both reporting 
quality measures, we find that low quality accounting accruals increase the likelihood an analyst 
will issue a revenue forecast, which supports our prediction that poor quality reporting increases 
analyst propensity to produce revenue estimates. Also, both models show that analysts who issue 
more precise EPS forecasts (our measure of analyst forecasting skill) are more likely to issue 
revenue forecasts. This provides support for hypothesis H2 that better earnings forecasters are 
more likely to issue revenue estimates to signal higher quality of their EPS estimates, and to 
increase visibility of their forecasts in the market. Looking at the economic effects, we find that a 
one standard deviation increase in ln CAQ (ln |D ACC|) leads to a 10.9% (5.4%) higher (lower) 
likelihood of issuing a revenue forecast. 
 For control variables, we find that analysts are more likely to issue revenue estimates 
early in the fiscal year, when the uncertainty about firm next year earnings is higher. Consistent 
with the evidence in Marks (2007) and Ertimur et al. (2011), we find that analysts with more 
forecasting experience are less likely to issue revenue estimates.15 Revenue forecasts are more 
common among smaller, low book-to-market and younger firms, among loss making and less 
profitable firms, and firms with high stock price volatility. This supports the prediction that 
revenue forecasts dominate among firms with high value uncertainty. Higher coverage of a firm 
by analysts increases the likelihood of a complementary revenue forecast, which suggests that 
analysts may use revenue estimates to differentiate themselves from other analysts when the 
                                                          
14 Non-discretionary accruals, |nD ACC|, show no association with the analyst decision to produce a revenue 
forecast. This confirms previous results that only the accruals component that is subject to managerial discretion is 
indicative of firm reporting quality (DeFond and Park 2001; Dechow and Dichev 2002; Dechow et al. 2010). 
15 Our empirical results are qualitatively the same when we use analyst firm-specific and industry-specific experience 
(results untabulated). The correlation coefficient between analyst general and industry-specific experience is 0.93 and 
0.634 between general and firm-specific experience.  
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competition among analysts is high. High variation in firm revenue and low operating leverage 
reduce the likelihood a revenue forecast will complement the EPS estimate. The former is 
consistent with the prediction that high forecasting difficulty reduces analyst propensity to 
produce a complementary revenue forecast; the latter evidence is consistent with revenue 
estimates being more informative of firm performance for firms with high fixed relative to 
variable costs. Analysts are less likely to produce revenue estimates for highly leveraged firms, 
which suggests that revenue estimates are unlikely to be useful in aiding investors in interpreting 
firm solvency when financial distress risk is high.    
The regressions’ pseudo R2 is 20.15% for CAQ and 20.09% for |D ACC|, which 
suggests the two models have good predictive power. Overall, results in Table 5 confirm that 
analysts exhibit higher propensity to issue revenue forecasts when the quality of firm financial 
reporting is low, and that better earnings forecasters are more likely to issue revenue estimates to 
signal higher quality of their EPS estimates. 
 
6 Sensitivity analysis 
 
We start the sensitivity analysis by testing if Table 5 results are not driven by our choice of the 
measure of the firm financial reporting quality, and of the analyst EPS forecasting skill. 
Subsequently, we examine sensitivity of the results to using Institutional Investors magazine 
analyst rankings to identify reputable analysts, and we run annual regressions to examine if the 
results in Table 5 are not confined to a specific sub-period. We also test if the results persist 
when we use Fama–MacBeth method and random sample selection as alternative ways to control 






6.1 Alternative measures of firm financial reporting quality 
 
Table 6 repeats the analysis from Table 5 when use three other measure of firm reporting quality. 
Column “Tot. accruals” shows results for regression model (2) when we use absolute total accruals 
to measure reporting quality, which is the absolute difference between net income and operating 
cash flow. Total accruals, as a measure of reporting quality, include managerial choices related to 
current and non-current accruals. The latter reflects managerial choices related to, among others, 
the assets’ useful life, and accounting for pension liabilities, which may have more lasting effects 
on the informativeness of firm earnings about future firm cash flows than managerial decisions 
on firm current accruals. Further, total accruals are easy to compute and not subject to 
estimation error as discretionary accruals are. The latter effect can reduce the power of 
discretionary accruals to capture reporting quality (Richardson et al. 2005). We find that analyst 
propensity to produce revenue estimates increases for firms with high magnitude of absolute 
total accruals, which corroborates our main results.  
 In column “Earn. persistence”, we use earnings persistence (E.persist)to measure reporting 
quality. In their review of earnings quality proxies, Dechow et al. (2010) classifies earnings 
persistence as an important determinant of earnings quality because persistence directly 
influences the usefulness of earnings in equity valuation. This is because more persistent earnings 
are better inputs into firm valuation models (Ohlson 1995; Barth and Hutton 2004). We measure 
earnings persistence as the autoregressive coefficient of the (assets-scaled) current earnings on 
past earnings (Dechow and Ge 2006). The coefficient on earnings persistence is significant and 
negative, which means that analysts are less likely to produce revenue forecasts for firm with 
more persistent earnings. This is consistent with our prediction that when firm earnings are more 
predictable, and consequently investors find it easier to value a firm based on earnings, analysts 
are less likely to produce revenue forecasts. 
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In column “Signed curr. accruals” we examine if the negative association between the 
analyst propensity to issue revenue estimates and firm financial reporting quality persists when 
we use the signed magnitude of discretionary accruals, D ACC. We use signed abnormal accruals 
because high positive values of discretionary accruals may indicate opportunistic upwards 
earnings management.16 Opportunistic downwards accrual management to misrepresent firm net 
income is less common (Nelson et al. 2002, 2003). Further, downwards accrual management may 
reflect managerial attempts to lower accruals volatility and to smooth earnings (Buckmaster 
2001), which may serve to improve quality of firm earnings. Controlling for the level of non-
discretionary accruals, we find a positive coefficient on signed discretionary accruals that is over 
fifteen times larger in magnitude compared to the coefficient on |D ACC| in Table 5. The 
difference in magnitudes of the coefficients on D ACC compared to |D ACC| is significant at 
less than 1%. This suggests that analysts are more likely to issue revenue forecasts when they 
suspect that poor reporting quality is due to opportunistic upwards earnings management.  
 The last columns of Table 6 present results from including firm earnings volatility (EPS 
STD) together with the variation in firm discretionary accruals, CAQ, in the regression model 
(2). This is because the positive coefficient on CAQ in Table 5 may reflect that analysts issue 
revenue forecasts for difficult-to-value firms that have high earnings volatility, even if these firms 
have high reporting quality. Column “Earn. STD” shows that the coefficient on EPS STD is 
positive and significant, which reflects that analysts are more likely to issue revenue forecasts for 
firms with high earnings uncertainty. Controlling for earnings volatility, CAQ, continues to show 
a positive relation with the likelihood of issuing a revenue forecast, which further corroborates 
our main conclusions. Overall, results in Table 6 suggest our conclusions are robust to using 
alternative measures of firm reporting quality. 
 
                                                          
16 Upwards earnings management may serve to avoid the negative price reaction when failing to meet analyst 
earnings forecast (Collins and Hribar 2002; Dechow and Skinner 2000; Brown and Caylor 2005), to increase 
managers’ compensation (Healy 1985; Bergstresser and Philippon 2006), or to increase firm value (Sloan 1996). 
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6.2 Alternative measures of analyst forecasting skill and analyst reputation 
 
Table 5 shows that analysts who issue more accurate EPS signal their quality through the issue of 
a revenue estimate. Table 7 tests sensitivity of this result to alternative definitions of analyst EPS 
forecasting ability.   
Column “Past EPS accuracy” of Table 7 reports results for regression model (2) when we 
use analyst past EPS forecast accuracy (|FE prev|) to capture analyst forecasting skill. We 
measure analyst past EPS forecast accuracy as the average EPS forecast error of all EPS 
estimates issued by the analyst for a firm in the previous fiscal year. |FE prev| is calculated at the 
announcement date of previous year earnings. Using analyst past forecast accuracy, we continue 
to find that better earnings forecasters have higher propensity to issue revenue forecasts, which 
corroborates our results in Table 5.   
Clement (1999) proposes to measure analyst EPS forecasting skill using the proportional 
mean adjusted forecast error (PMAFE), which is the ratio of analyst EPS forecast error to the 
mean EPS forecast error of all EPS forecasts issued for a firm in a fiscal year. PMAFE captures 
analyst EPS forecasting skill relative to that of other analysts following the firm. Column 
“PMAFE” in Table 7 shows model (2) regression results when we substitute PMAFE for EPS 
forecast error. Using the relative EPS forecast accuracy, we continue to find that better earnings 
forecasters are more likely to issue revenue forecast to complement EPS estimates. This means 
that our conclusions are immune to the choice of absolute rather than relative analyst EPS 
accuracy measure.  
 Ertimur et al. (2011) use analyst rankings from the October issue of the Institutional 
Investors magazine to identify analysts with higher reputation. To test sensitivity of our result to 
including this measure of analyst reputation, column “Star analysts” show results for model (2) 
when we include an indicator variable for analysts ranked top by the Institutional Investors 
magazine in the most recent annual ranking. Specifically, we use the Institutional Investors 
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magazine ranking from the October issue of year t to identify forecasts issued by star analysts 
over the next 12-months.17 Consistent with Ertimur et al. (2011), we find that more reputable 
analysts are less likely to produce revenue forecasts. Controlling for analyst ranking, the 
coefficient on analyst EPS forecast error remains significant and similar in magnitude to that 
from Table 5 (−1.973 vs. −1.978). This further corroborates our prediction that controlling for 
analyst reputation, analysts use revenue estimates to signal their forecasting ability.  
 
6.3 Annual regressions and Fama–MacBeth approach 
 
Our sample period spans distinct periods for the US stock market: the market downturn 
following the burst of the internet bubble, the subsequent recovery period, and the recent 
financial crisis. Further, a number of regulatory changes have been introduced over the sample 
period, which could influence our results. These include the introduction of the Fair Disclosure 
regulation, Sarbanes–Oxley act, the Global Settlement, the NASD 2711 regulation and the SEC 
rule 472 intended to reduce conflicts of interests in analyst research and to promote less biased 
sell-side equity research. To test if our results are not confined to a specific subperiod, or 
influenced by certain regulatory changes, we replicate the analysis from Table 5 for each fiscal 
year over the sample period.  
Table 8 shows results from annual regressions for the regression model (2).  For brevity, 
we report only results from the logit regression where we use variation in firm discretionary 
accruals to measure reporting quality. The coefficient on CAQ is positive and significant in 
predicting the analyst decision to produce a revenue forecast across all fiscal years, which means 
that our results are robust to the choice of the sample period. Further, the coefficient on ln 
                                                          
17 To combine analyst names from IBES with Individual Investors magazine rankings, we require the IBES 
translation file, which is only available for 2005 IBES edition. Using the 2005 IBES translation file could potentially 
misclassify top ranked analysts that started reporting on IBES after 2005. We inspected the matching process but 
found no evidence that the matching between Individual Investors magazine rankings and IBES is poorer after 
2005. More recent versions of the IBES translation file are unavailable as Thomson-Reuters suspended access to the 
translation file for academic research.  
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|FE| is negative and significant across all years but 2002 and 2007, further reinforcing our 
conclusions that analysts use revenue forecasts to signal their quality to investors.  
The last columns of Table 8 show results from Fama–MacBeth regressions, which is an 
alternative way to control for inflated t-statistics due to cross-sectional dependence. The 
magnitudes and the significance of the coefficients are similar to that in Table 5. Overall, we 
conclude that results from annual regressions and from the Fama–MacBeth approach are similar 
to that in Table 5.   
 
6.4 Random sample selection 
 
Using multiple analyst EPS forecasts for a firm in a fiscal year could influence our hypothesis 
tests if standard-errors clustered on analyst and firm fail to fully adjust for the upwards bias in 
the significance of coefficient test statistics. To gauge the sensitivity of our results to this 
problem, we randomly choose one analyst EPS forecast for a firm in a fiscal year and replicate 
the analysis in Table 5. Table 9 shows that while the sample size falls to 138,114 analyst–firm 
observations over nine fiscal years, the relations between accruals quality measures and the 
likelihood of issuing revenue forecasts remain unchanged. Also, analyst EPS forecast error 
retains the negative relation with the likelihood of issuing a revenue forecast. This confirms 
proper test specification in Table 5.  
 
6.5 Initiations of revenue forecast issues 
 
Our results may be affected by the recursive effect a complementary revenue forecast issue may 
have on firm financial reporting quality. This is because a revenue estimate may aid investors in 
identifying firms that engage in revenue management to boost firm net income. In particular, a 
revenue forecast can help investors identify firms where unexpectedly high revenue, and 
consequently high earnings, come from sales of fixed assets (Bartov 1993), or discount sales 
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close to the end of the fiscal year (Roychowdhury 2006). Higher cost of revenue management in 
the presence of analyst revenue forecasts may incentivize managers to substitute revenue 
management for accruals management, which could explain higher analyst propensity to produce 
a revenue forecast when the quality of firm accruals is low.18  
To test if our results are unaffected by the potential effect revenue forecasts have on the 
quality of firm financial reporting, we look at initiations of complementary revenue forecasts for 
a firm. The dependent variable is an indicator variable, which equals one for the first revenue 
forecast issued for a firm, and zero otherwise. We remove all EPS forecasts for a firm after the 
first revenue forecast has been issued. Firm financial reporting quality is measured before the 
analyst initiates producing revenue estimates for the firm, thus the measure is unaffected by the 
potential shift to accrual-based earnings management after a revenue estimate is issued.  
Table 10 shows results from logit regressions predicting initiations of revenue forecasts 
for a firm. The independent variables are the predictors of the analyst choice to issue a 
complementary revenue forecast from regression model (2). Similarly to the main results, we find 
that analysts are more likely to initiate revenue forecasts for firms with high variation in 
discretionary accruals, and for firms with high magnitude of discretionary accuracy. This 
supports the conclusion that low quality reporting increases analyst propensity to issue a revenue 
forecast to supplement the EPS estimate. Further, better earnings forecasters are more likely to 
initiate revenue forecasts for a firm. Overall, results from Table 10 corroborate our main 
findings. 
 
7 Why are revenue forecasts useful to investors when the quality of firm reporting is low? 
 
We predict that a revenue forecast is a valuable measure of firm performance when firm 
reporting quality is poor because revenue forecast accuracy should be less adversely affected by 
                                                          
18 Our prediction is consistent with the tradeoff model between accrual and real earnings manipulations in Zang 
(2011). She shows that managers consider real and accrual earnings management as substitutes with the choice 
between the two earnings management activities depending on their marginal cost.  
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poor reporting quality compared to EPS forecast precision. As a result, investors rely more on 
the (relatively more accurate) revenue than EPS estimates in their investment decisions when 
reporting quality is low. To confirm validity of these propositions, we perform two additional 
tests. First, we examine the sensitivity of EPS and revenue forecast error to the quality of firm 
financial reporting. Second, we test if the price reaction to the announcement of revenue and 
EPS forecasts varies with the quality of firm reporting. Specifically, we expect investors to attach 
higher weight to revenue forecasts compared to EPS estimates when the quality of firm 
reporting is poor.  
 
7.1 The relation between EPS and revenue forecast accuracy and reporting quality 
 
As a simple test of the relation between EPS and revenue forecast accuracy and reporting quality, 
Figure 2 plots the EPS and the revenue forecast error across deciles formed on the basis of the 
variation in discretionary accruals and the magnitude of discretionary accruals. Figure 2a shows 
that the EPS forecast error for standalone EPS estimates and for EPS forecasts accompanied by 
revenue estimates exhibits an upwards trend when moving from the decile with the highest (High 
Q) to the lowest (Low Q) reporting quality. This suggests that EPS forecast quality decreases as 
reporting quality deteriorates. The error of a revenue estimate is less affected by poor reporting 
quality and shows a downward trend when moving from decile 4 to 10.19 Figure 2b replicates the 
analysis for decile portfolios formed on the magnitude of discretionary accruals and shows 
similar patterns to that in Figure 2a.  
 To test the significance of the relation between the quality of firm financial reporting and 
the accuracy of analyst EPS and revenue forecasts, we regress the error of the EPS forecast and 
of the revenue estimate on the two proxies for the quality of firm reporting. The two accuracy 
regressions control for analyst and firm characteristics from model (2) as these characteristics 
                                                          
19 The downward trend when moving from decile 4 to 10 may be because analysts devote more effort to accurately 
forecast revenue estimates when the quality of firm reporting is poor as accurate revenue estimates can compensate 
for less accurate EPS estimates and are more valuable to investors when the quality of firm reporting is poor.  
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correlate with analyst forecasting skill and the difficulty of the forecasting task. To ensure 
comparability of the EPS and the revenue accuracy results, the sample of EPS forecasts includes 
the EPS estimates that are accompanied by revenue forecasts. Table 11 shows that the analyst 
EPS forecast error increases for firms with poor reporting quality, in line with the results in 
Figure 2.20 For the revenue forecast accuracy regression, the coefficients on the finical reporting 
quality proxies are insignificant. This means that the quality of analyst revenue estimate is 
insensitive to the quality of firm reporting. Overall, Table 11 confirms that a revenue forecast is a 
valuable (complementary) measure of firm performance when reporting quality is poor because 
it is unaffected by poor reporting quality.  
 
7.2 Price reaction to analyst EPS forecasts and revenue forecast announcements 
 
Next, we examine if revenue estimates are more valuable to investors when the quality of firm 
reporting is low. We use a three-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) centered on the EPS 
forecast revision date to measure the price reaction to analyst percentage EPS (ΔEPS) and 
revenue forecast revisions (ΔREV).21 We expect the coefficient on ΔREV to be positive if 
revenue forecasts have incremental information content compared to EPS estimates. Further, we 
include an interaction term between the EPS forecast revision and an indicator variable for a 
revenue forecast (DREV*ΔEPS) to capture if the complementary revenue estimate lends 
credibility to the EPS forecast revision (Keung 2010). This is because the revenue forecast allows 
investors to verify the quality of the EPS forecast by disaggregating it into the sales volume and 
the profit margin. To test if revenue estimates are more valuable to investors compared to EPS 
estimates when the reporting quality is poor, we include interaction terms between EPS and 
                                                          
20 Our conclusions remain the same when we use (1) the combined sample of stand-alone EPS forecasts and EPS 
forecasts accompanied by revenue estimates, and for (2) stand-alone EPS estimates.  
21 We use the CRSP value-weighted index as the benchmark to measure abnormal returns. Similarly to Keung 
(2010), we assume that the revenue forecast revision is zero for stand-alone EPS estimates. We require that the 
forecasts used to calculate revisions are not further than 300 days apart and that the revisions in EPS and revenue 
forecasts are for the same fiscal year. The former criterion eliminates infrequently revised forecasts and the later 
ensures forecast revisions reflect only analyst new information for a fiscal year. These additional selection criteria 
reduce the sample size to 345,632 observations. 
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revenue forecast revisions and the variation in discretionary accruals, i.e. ΔEPS*CAQ and 
ΔREV*CAQ. We expect that the price reaction to EPS forecast announcement decreases as the 
quality of firm reporting deteriorates because the credibility of analyst EPS estimates is lower. As 
the accuracy of revenue estimates is unaffected by the quality of firm reporting, the coefficient 
on ΔREV*CAQ should be indistinguishable from zero.  
To control for the effect revisions in stock recommendations have on stock prices, we 
include three dummy variables for the direction of the recommendation revisions. Upgrade 
(Downgrade) is an indicator variable that equals one if the analysts revises the stock 
recommendation upwards (downwards) to a more (less) favorable level, and zero otherwise. 
Reiteration is an indicator variable that equals one if the analyst reiterates the recommendation for 
the stock. The specification of the regression model is: 
0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8
ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt it ijt
it ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt
CAR EPS REV DREV EPS CAQ EPS
CAQ REV Upgrade Reiteration Downgrade u
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   
        
     
            (3) 
where the intercept term captures EPS forecast reiterations that are unaccompanied by either a 
revenue forecast revision or a stock recommendation revision. Standard errors are clustered on 
analyst and firm.  
 Table 12 reports regression results for model (3).22 Column “Without CAQ interactions” 
shows regression results for model (3) without controlling for the effect the quality of firm 
financial reporting has on the price reaction to EPS and revenue forecast revisions. Consistent 
with the previous literature (e.g. Sinha et al. 1997; Francis and Soffer 1997), we find a positive 
and significant coefficient on EPS forecast revisions. Revenue forecast announcements contain 
incremental information to EPS forecasts with a one standard deviation increase in ΔREV 
leading to 0.76% (0.195*0.039) abnormal price reaction compared to 1.02% (0.032*0.314) for a 
one standard deviation increase in ΔEPS. As in Keung (2010) and Baginski et al. (2004), we find 
                                                          
22 In unreported results we find that the mean CAR is −0.16%, which reflects that the mean EPS and revenue 
forecast revisions are negative (−3.95% and −0.13% respectively). The negative average values for CARs, and for 
EPS and revenue forecast revisions are largely due to the inclusion of the recent financial crisis in the sample period. 
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that the presence of a revenue forecast has an incremental effect on the price response 
coefficient to revisions in EPS estimates. A one percent revision in an EPS forecast accompanied 
by a revenue estimate increases abnormal returns around the announcement date by 1.6%, a 50% 
increase compare to a stand-alone EPS revision. The evidence that revenue forecasts contain 
incremental information to earnings forecasts and stock recommendations, and that the presence 
of a revenue forecast adds credibility to analyst EPS forecasts is not surprising. This is because 
we document that analysts issue revenue forecasts to compensate for inaccurate EPS estimates 
when the quality of firm reporting is low.  
To test if revenue estimates are more valuable to investors when the quality of firm 
reporting deteriorates, we examine the full specification of model (3). Column “CAQ interactions” 
shows a significant negative coefficient on ΔEPS*CAQ but not on ΔREV*CAQ. This confirms 
that investors attach a lower weight to EPS forecast revisions when the quality of firm reporting 
is low but continue to rely on revenue estimates in their investment decisions. Together, results 
in Table 11 and 12 explain why investors value revenue estimates particularly high when the 




This study examines the recent trend in analysts issuing revenue forecasts to complement EPS 
estimates. We document that the proportion of revenue estimates to complement EPS forecasts 
increases from 11.8% in 2000 to 68.7% in 2008, which suggests that stand-alone EPS estimates 
became less common over our sample period. However, to date we know little about what 
determines the analyst choice to issue revenue forecasts to complement EPS estimates.  
We propose that the analyst decision to produce a revenue estimate is influenced by the 
quality of firm financial reporting and by the analyst EPS forecasting skill. Investors demand 
revenue forecasts because revenue forecast accuracy is less adversely affected by poor reporting 
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quality compared to EPS forecasts precision, and as a result, investors rely more on revenue than 
on EPS estimates in their investment decision when reporting quality is low. Further, more 
skilled analysts can use revenue estimates to signal their forecasting skill. This is because only 
these analysts want their forecasts to be subject to higher market scrutiny, and because accurate 
revenue forecasts, as inputs into EPS estimates, are credible signals that the quality of EPS 
forecasts is high.  
Consistent with our predictions, we find that the likelihood an analyst will supplement 
the EPS estimate with a revenue forecast relates negatively to a number of proxies for the quality 
of firm reporting that include: the variation in discretionary accruals, the magnitude of absolute 
discretionary accruals, earnings persistence, absolute total accruals, and earnings volatility. 
Further, we confirm that analysts who issue more accurate EPS forecasts are more likely to issue 
revenue estimates. The results are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests and supported by 
additional tests that examine how firm reporting quality affects EPS and revenue forecast 
accuracy, and how investors react to revenue and EPS forecast announcements when the quality 
of firm reporting is low.  
This study contributes to the fledgling literature on the importance of supplementary 
information produced by analysts, such as revenue estimates, in firm valuation, and to the 
literature on the interaction between the firm and analysts as information intermediaries in the 
market. In particular, we document that analysts use revenue forecasts to mitigate the negative 
effect poor reporting quality has on the accuracy of their EPS estimates, which contributes to the 
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Fig. 1 The frequency of analyst revenue forecasts in all EPS estimates 
The figure shows the frequency of revenue forecasts in all EPS estimates across decile sorts on the variation in 
discretionary accruals (CAQ) and on the magnitude of discretionary accruals (|D ACC|). Portfolio High Q contains 
















The frequency of  revenue forecasts in all EPS estimates 
sort on CAQ








Fig. 2 Analyst EPS and revenue forecast errors across deciles formed on the basis of firm 
reporting quality  
 
The figure shows the mean EPS and revenue forecast errors for decile sorts on the variation in discretionary 
accruals (CAQ), Figure 2a, and on the magnitude of discretionary accruals (|D ACC|), Figure 2b. |FE| | revenue 
issue denotes EPS forecast error in the presence of the accompanying revenue estimate. |FE| for stand-alone EPS 
denotes EPS forecast error for stand-alone EPS estimates. |FE REV| stands for revenue forecast error. Portfolio 
High Q contains stocks with the highest quality of firm reporting and portfolio Low Q includes stocks with the 





















Fig. 2a EPS and revenue forecast accuracy: sorts on CAQ 
|FE| | revenue issue




















Fig. 2b EPS and revenue forecast accuracy: sorts on |D ACC| 
|FE| | revenue issue









A revenue forecast dummy, which is an indicator variable that equals one if the analyst issued 
a revenue estimate to complement the EPS forecast. 
EPS A one-year ahead earnings-per-share forecast.  
REV 
A one-year ahead revenue forecast scaled by the number of shares outstanding at the end of 
the forecast issue month. Thomson Reuters Estimates Glossary (2008) for IBES defines 
revenue forecasts on IBES as “a corporation’s net revenue, generally derived from core 
business activities.”.  
|FE| 
Analyst EPS forecast error, computed as the absolute difference between the forecasted and 
the actual earnings scaled by the stock price at the end of the previous fiscal year.  
|FE REV| 
Analyst revenue forecast error, computed as the absolute difference between the forecasted 
and the actual revenue, scaled by the end-of-month number of shares outstanding, and 
divided by the stock price at the end of the previous fiscal year.  
Horizon 
Forecast timeliness, which is measured by the number of days between the EPS forecast 
announcement date and the fiscal year-end. 
Gexp  
Analyst general experience, computed as the number of years an analyst has issued at least 
one EPS forecast. 
A_#Firm 
Analyst workload, which is measured as the number of companies for which an analyst issued 
at least one EPS forecast over the previous 12 months. 
Bsize 
Broker size, measured as the number of analysts employed by the broker that issued at least 
one EPS forecast in the previous 12-months. 
|FE prev| 
Analyst previous forecast accuracy, measured as the mean EPS forecast error of a minimum 2 
EPS forecasts issued by the analyst for a firm in the previous fiscal year. Analyst previous 
forecast accuracy is calculated at the announcement date of previous year earnings. 
PMAFE 
Analyst proportional mean-adjusted forecast error, which is the ratio of the analyst EPS 
forecast error to the mean EPS forecast error of all EPS forecasts issued for a given firm in a 




Current accruals, defined as the change in current assets, less change in cash, less change in 
current liabilities plus the change in debt in current liabilities. CA are scaled by average total 
assets for the current and previous fiscal year. 
CFO 
Cash flow from operations, which is equal to income before extraordinary items less current 
accruals. CFO is scaled by average total assets for the current and previous fiscal year. 
PPE Gross value of property plan and equipment scaled by average assets. 
ΔSAL 
Change in firm sales reported on Compustat, current compared to previous fiscal year, scaled 
by average assets. 
CAQ 
Variation in firm discretionary accruals, which is measured by the standard deviation of firm 
residuals from the McNichols (2002) accruals model for the previous four fiscal years.  
|nD ACC| 
The magnitude of firm non-discretionary accruals, which is measured as the predicted value 
from the McNichols (2002) accruals model for the firm for the previous fiscal year. 
|D ACC| 
The magnitude of discretionary accruals, which is measured by the firm residual from 
McNichols (2002) accruals model for the previous fiscal year. 
MV  
Firm size, computed as the firm market capitalization at the end of the previous fiscal year in 
$ million. 
Follow 
Intensity of analyst coverage, which is calculated as the number of analysts issuing at least one 
EPS forecast for a company over the previous 12 months. 
COV  
Price volatility, measured as the coefficient of variation of stock price over 90-days prior to 










Revenue uncertainty, computed as the standard deviation in firm revenue reported on 
Compustat for the previous four fiscal years. Firm revenue is scaled by total assets. 
LEV Firm financial leverage, which is defined as the ratio of total long-term debt over total assets. 
Age 
Firm age, which is the number of years between the previous fiscal year-end and the firm’s first 
appearance on CRSP. 
NI Income before extraordinary items from Compustat. 
ROA Return on assets, which is NI scaled by firm assets.  
Dloss 
A loss dummy, which is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm's actual EPS on IBES 
is negative and zero otherwise. 
Marg Net margin, which is the ratio of NI over Compustat firm revenue. 
B/M 
Book-to-market ration, measured as the ratio of total common equity over the firm market 




Absolute total accruals, which is the absolute difference between NI and operating cash flow, 
scaled by average total assets for the current and previous fiscal year. Operating cash flow is 
the NI plus depreciation less current accruals. 
E.persist 
Earnings persistence, which is measured as the coefficient from Dechow and Ge's (2006) OLS 
regressions of the next fiscal year NI on current period NI. We scale NI by average total assets 
for the current and previous fiscal year. 
EPS STD 
Earnings uncertainty, measured as the standard deviation in firm NI for the previous four fiscal 
years. Firm NI is scaled by total assets. 
Star 
A star analyst indicator, which is an indicator variable that equals one if the analyst was ranked 
top by the Institutional Investor magazine in the most recent annual All American research 
ranking and zero otherwise.  
CAR 
Cumulative abnormal return over a three-day window centered on the EPS forecast issue date. 
We use the CRSP value-weighted return as the benchmark in calculating abnormal returns. 
∆EPS 
Earnings forecast revision, which is calculated as the percentage difference between the current 
and the previous analyst EPS forecast for a firm. 
∆REV 
Revenue forecast revision, which is calculated as the percentage difference between the current 
and the previous analyst revenue forecast for a firm. 
Upgrade 
Stock recommendation upgrade, which is an indicator variable that equals one if the analyst 
revises the stock recommendation upwards, and zero otherwise. 
Revision 
Stock recommendation revision which is an indicator variable that equals one if the analyst 
reiterates the stock recommendation, and zero otherwise. 
Downgrade 
Stock recommendation downgrade, which is an indicator variable that equals one if the analyst 
revises the stock recommendation downwards, and zero otherwise. 
Industry dummies 10 industry dummies based on the sector code from IBES SIG code 
Year dummies Year dummies 






Table 2 Distribution of earnings and revenue forecasts over the sample period 
 
Total #EPS #only EPS #EPS and REV #Analysts #Brokers #Firms 
2000 41104 36253 4851 2572 226 1351 
2001 48289 41344 6945 2658 212 1238 
2002 51075 36166 14909 2888 218 1313 
2003 58625 31943 26682 2796 269 1508 
2004 66149 28030 38119 2812 299 1625 
2005 67798 25938 41860 2834 296 1631 
2006 70317 24585 45732 2871 273 1640 
2007 67284 22532 44752 2778 260 1587 
2008 68796 21507 47289 2636 259 1411 
Total 539437 268298 271139 6940 532 2615 
The table shows the total number of EPS forecasts (Total #EPS), the number of stand-alone EPS forecasts      
(#only EPS), and the number of EPS forecasts complemented by revenue estimates (#EPS and REV) across fiscal 
years 2000–2008. Column #Analysts denotes the number of unique analysts, #Brokers the number of unique 
brokerage houses, and #Firms shows the number of unique firms. Row Total reports the number of unique 









Table 3 Univariate portfolio analysis 
  only EPS EPS and REV 
Panel A: Financial reporting quality measures     
CAQ 5.335% 6.458% 
p 0.000 
|D ACC| 4.452% 5.192% 
p 0.000 
N 6997 6307 
Panel B: Industry distribution     
Finance 38.5% 61.5% 
Health 36.9% 63.1% 
Consumer non-durables 53.1% 46.9% 




Energy 74.3% 25.7% 
Transportation 61.2% 38.8% 
Technology 32.0% 68.0% 
Basic industries 63.7% 36.3% 
Capital goods 51.0% 49.0% 
Public utilities 66.5% 33.5% 
N 268298 271139 
Panel A shows averages of financial reporting quality measures for stand-alone EPS forecasts (only EPS) and for 
EPS forecasts complemented by a revenue estimate (EPS and REV). CAQ is the variation in discretionary accruals, 
and |D ACC| is the absolute level of discretionary accruals. p is the p-value for the difference in means of the 
financial reporting measures between the groups, and N is the number of observations. Panel B shows the 
distribution of stand-alone EPS forecasts and EPS forecasts complemented by revenue estimates across 11 industry 




Table 4 Descriptive statistics  
Variable Mean Median STD p 
Panel A: Analyst- and broker-related explanatory variables (N=539,437) 
DREV 0.503 1.000 0.500 0.000 
IFEI 1.32% 0.38% 2.98% 0.000 
Horizon 178.079 166.000 97.038 0.000 
Gexp 6.395 6.000 3.274 0.000 
A_#Firm 13.618 13.000 6.533 0.000 
Bsize 56.176 48.000 41.403 0.000 
Variable Mean Median STD p 
Panel B: Firm-related explanatory variables (N=13,304 firm-years) 
  
CAQ 0.059 0.038 0.058 0.000 
|D ACC| 0.048 0.028 0.056 0.000 
|nD ACC| 0.048 0.030 0.053 0.000 
MV 3887 702 9811 0.000 
Follow 10.547 8.000 8.958 0.000 
COV 0.087 0.069 0.061 0.000 
STD REV 0.147 0.104 0.137 0.000 
B/M 0.498 0.422 0.396 0.000 
Age 21.034 14.337 17.064 0.000 
ROA 1.88% 4.42% 14.38% 0.000 
Dloss 17.91% 0.00% 38.35% 0.000 
Marg −0.111 0.045 0.900 0.000 
LEV 0.181 0.145 0.184 0.000 
The table shows mean and median values of the variables from the regression model (2) together with their standard 
deviation  and p-values. Panel A shows results for analyst- and broker-related variables. Panel B shows results for 





Table 5 Predicting the analyst decision to issue a revenue forecast to complement EPS 
estimates 
 
CAQ quality measure  |D ACC| quality measure 
 
Estimate ME p Estimate ME p 
Intercept 1.901   0.000 1.730   0.000 
ln CAQ 0.118 10.9% 0.000 
   
ln |D ACC|    
0.029 3.9% 0.000 
ln |nD ACC|    
0.010 1.3% 0.175 
ln |FE| −1.976 −5.4% 0.000 −1.978 −5.4% 0.000 
ln Horizon 0.020 1.5% 0.008 0.020 1.6% 0.006 
ln Gexp −0.146 −7.3% 0.015 −0.147 −7.4% 0.014 
ln A_#Firm 0.006 0.4% 0.895 0.004 0.2% 0.941 
ln Bsize 0.035 3.7% 0.234 0.034 3.6% 0.246 
ln MV −0.099 −16.3% 0.000 −0.111 −18.3% 0.000 
ln Follow 0.220 15.3% 0.000 0.231 16.1% 0.000 
COV 1.148 6.3% 0.000 1.281 7.1% 0.000 
STD REV −0.354 −4.3% 0.029 −0.275 −3.3% 0.089 
B/M −0.202 −6.3% 0.000 −0.245 −7.6% 0.000 
ln Age −0.165 −12.4% 0.000 −0.172 −13.0% 0.000 
ROA −0.509 −5.8% 0.000 −0.570 −6.5% 0.000 
Dloss 0.094 3.0% 0.016 0.120 3.9% 0.002 
Marg 0.108 7.5% 0.000 0.104 7.3% 0.000 
LEV −0.500 −8.7% 0.000 −0.547 −9.5% 0.000 




















R2 20.15%     20.09%     
The table reports results (Estimate) from logistic regressions predicting that an analyst will issue a revenue forecast 
to complement the EPS estimate. Column CAQ quality measure shows results when we include the variation in 
discretionary accruals, CAQ, as the reporting quality measure. Column |D ACC| quality measure presents results 
when we use the absolute level of discretionary accruals, |D ACC|, to capture the quality of firm reporting. Other 
variables definitions are in Table 1. ME are the marginal effects, ln is the logarithm, p are p-values for regression 
coefficients. N is the number of observations, Wald 2 is Wald 2-test for model specification and p(2) the 






Table 6 Sensitivity analysis: alternative measures of reporting quality  









Intercept 1.545 0.000   1.594 0.000   1.595 0.000   1.762 0.000 
ln |ACC_T| 0.354 0.017 
         
E.persist 
   
−0.286 0.004 
      
ln D ACC 
      
0.461 0.001 
   
ln nD ACC 
      
0.079 0.457 
   
ln CAQ 
         
0.093 0.000 
EPS STD 
         
0.791 0.000 












































































































































R2 20.07%    20.07%   20.08%    20.18% 
The table shows results (Estimate) from logistic regressions predicting that an analyst will issue a revenue forecast to 
complement the EPS estimate. Column Tot. accruals reports results for regression model (2) when we use absolute 
total accruals, |ACC_T|, to measure reporting quality, which is the absolute difference between net income and 
operating cash flow. Column Earn. persistence shows regression results when we use earnings persistence,           
E.persist, to measure reporting quality. Column Signed curr. accruals presents results when we use the signed magnitude 
of discretionary accruals, D ACC, , to measure reporting quality. nD ACC are non-discretionary accruals. Column 
Earn. STD shows results when we include earnings volatility, STD EPS, in the regression model (2). Other variables 
definitions are in Table 1. ln is the logarithm, p are p-values for regression coefficients. N is the number of 






Table 7 Sensitivity analysis: alternative measures of analyst forecasting skill 
  







Intercept 1.744 0.000 
 
1.691 0.000   1.901 0.000 





ln |FE prev| −1.928 0.006 
      
PMAFE 
   
−0.121 0.000 
   
ln |FE| 
      
−1.973 0.000 
Star 
      
−0.336 0.088 































































































R2 17.57%   20.23%   20.16% 
The table reports results (Estimate) from logistic regressions predicting that an analyst will issue a revenue estimate 
to complement the EPS forecast. Column Past EPS accuracy reports results for regression model (2) when we use 
analyst past EPS forecast accuracy (|FE prev|) to capture analyst forecasting skill. Column PMAFE shows results 
when we use the proportional mean adjusted forecast error (PMAFE) to measure analyst EPS forecasting skill. 
Column Star analysts show results for model (2) regression when we include an indicator variable for analysts ranked 
top by the Institutional Investor magazine in the previous year. Other variables definitions are in Table 1. ln is the 
logarithm, p are p-values for regression coefficients. N is the number of observations, Wald 2is Wald 2-test for 








Table 8 Annual and Fama-MacBeth regressions 





















































































































































































































 Table 8 continued 










FM estimate p(FM) 


















































































































































































   















   
R2 9.50%   7.59%   8.60%   7.96%       
Columns fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2008 report results (Estimate) for annual logistic regressions predicting that an analyst will issue a revenue forecast to complement the EPS 
estimate. Column Fama–MacBeth shows results using Fama–MacBeth analysis. Variables definitions are in Table 1. ln is the logarithm, p are p-values for annual regressions, and 
p(FM) are p-values based on Fama-MacBeth t-test. N is the number of observations, Wald 2 is Wald 2-test for model specification and p(2) the corresponding p-value. R2 is the 




Table 9 Random sample regression results 





Intercept 2.106 0.000 
 
1.960 0.000 
ln CAQ 0.111 0.000 
   
ln |D ACC| 
   
0.025 0.001 
ln |nD ACC| 
   
0.018 0.011 
ln |FE| −1.713 0.000 
 
−1.700 0.000 
ln Horizon −0.038 0.000 
 
−0.038 0.000 
ln Gexp −0.100 0.065 
 
−0.101 0.063 
ln A_#Firm −0.057 0.185 
 
−0.059 0.167 
ln Bsize 0.053 0.041 
 
0.052 0.045 
ln MV −0.112 0.000 
 
−0.122 0.000 
ln Follow 0.235 0.000 
 
0.244 0.000 
COV 1.183 0.000 
 
1.311 0.000 
STD REV −0.190 0.150 
 
−0.125 0.343 
B/M −0.208 0.000 
 
−0.243 0.000 
ln Age −0.171 0.000 
 
−0.179 0.000 
ROA −0.358 0.002 
 
−0.410 0.000 
Dloss 0.067 0.100 
 
0.093 0.022 
Marg 0.096 0.000 
 
0.093 0.000 
LEV −0.574 0.000 
 
−0.611 0.000 
Industry effect Yes 
 
Yes 












R2 21.01%   20.96% 
The table shows results (Estimate) from logistic regressions predicting that an analyst will issues a revenue estimate 
to complement the EPS forecast when we randomly choose one analyst EPS forecast for a firm in a fiscal year. 
Column CAQ quality measure shows results when we include the variation in discretionary accruals, CAQ, as the 
reporting quality measure. Column |D ACC| quality measure reports results when we use the absolute level of 
discretionary accruals, |D ACC|, to capture the quality of firm reporting. Variables definitions are in Table 1. ln is 
the logarithm, p are p-values for regression coefficients. N is the number of observations, Wald 2is Wald 2-test for 





Table 10 Revenue forecast initiations 
      





Intercept 2.551 0.000 
 
2.330 0.000 
ln CAQ 0.132 0.000 
   
ln |D ACC| 
   
0.031 0.006 
ln |nD ACC| 
   
0.009 0.405 
ln |FE| −1.648 0.003 
 
−1.601 0.004 
ln Horizon 0.151 0.000 
 
0.151 0.000 
ln Gexp −0.594 0.000 
 
−0.594 0.000 
ln A_#Firm −0.245 0.000 
 
−0.247 0.000 
ln Bsize −0.012 0.743 
 
−0.013 0.723 
ln MV −0.115 0.000 
 
−0.129 0.000 
ln Follow 0.140 0.013 
 
0.151 0.008 
COV 1.001 0.001 
 
1.164 0.000 
STD REV −0.325 0.107 
 
−0.231 0.250 
B/M −0.373 0.000 
 
−0.418 0.000 
ln Age −0.361 0.000 
 
−0.369 0.000 
ROA −0.875 0.000 
 
−0.928 0.000 
Dloss −0.046 0.457 
 
−0.015 0.809 
Marg 0.046 0.119 
 
0.039 0.179 
LEV −0.288 0.029 
 
−0.343 0.009 
Industry effect Yes 
 
Yes 












R2 17.24%   17.15% 
The table reports results (Estimate) from logistic regressions predicting initiations of revenue forecast issues for a 
firm. The dependent variable is an indicator variable, which equals one for the first revenue forecast issued for a 
firm, and zero otherwise. We remove all EPS forecasts for the firm after the first revenue forecast has been issued. 
Column CAQ quality measure shows results when we include the variation in discretionary accruals, CAQ, as the 
reporting quality measure. Column |D ACC| quality measure documents results when we use the absolute level of 
discretionary accruals, |D ACC|, to capture the quality of firm reporting. Variables definitions are in Table 1. ln is 
the logarithm, p are p-values for regression coefficients, N is the number of observations, Wald 2is Wald 2-test for 






Table 11 EPS and revenue forecast accuracy regressions 
              
 
EPS forecast error 
 
Revenue forecast error 
 
CAQ quality measure 
 
|D ACC| quality measure 
 
CAQ quality measure 
 
















ln CAQ 0.136 0.002 
    
−0.140 0.443 
   
ln |D ACC| 
   
0.083 0.000 
    
0.096 0.245 
ln |nD ACC| 
   
0.022 0.293 
    
0.002 0.980 





































































































































R2 24.19%   24.23%   16.21%   16.22% 
The table documents results (Estimate) from accuracy regressions where the dependent variable is either the EPS forecast error (EPS forecast error) or the revenue forecast error 
(Revenue forecast error). Column CAQ quality measure presents results when we include the variation in discretionary accruals, CAQ, as the reporting quality measure. Column |D 
ACC| quality measure show results when we use the absolute level of discretionary accruals, |D ACC|, to capture the quality of firm reporting. Variables definitions are in Table 1. 
The sample of EPS estimates includes 271,139 EPS forecasts that are accompanied by revenue estimates. ln is the logarithm, p are p-values for regression coefficients, N is the 




Table 12 Price reaction to analyst EPS and revenue forecast announcements 





Intercept 0.001 0.035 
 
0.001 0.030 
∆EPS 0.032 0.000 
 
0.036 0.000 
∆REV 0.195 0.000 
 
0.176 0.000 
DREV*∆EPS 0.016 0.000 
 
0.018 0.000 
Upgrade 0.032 0.000 
 
0.032 0.000 
Revision 0.003 0.123 
 
0.003 0.122 




   
−0.068 0.004 
CAQ*∆REV 











R2 6.74%   6.77% 
The table reports regression results (Estimate) for mode (3) that examines the price reaction to analyst EPS (∆EPS) 
and revenue (∆REV) forecast revisions. The dependent variable is a three-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) 
centered on the EPS forecast announcement date. Column Without CAQ interaction shows regression results for 
model (3) without controlling for the effect quality of firm financial reporting has on the price reaction to EPS and 
revenue forecast revisions. Column With CAQ interaction  shows regression results for model (3), which includes the 
interaction terms between EPS and revenue forecast revisions and the variation in discretionary accruals 
(CAQ*∆EPS and CAQ*∆REV). Other variables definitions are in Table 1. p are p-values for regression 
coefficients, N is the number of observations, F-test is the F-test for model specification and p(F) is the 
corresponding p-value. R2 is the R-squared. 
 
